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MEDITERRANEAN REGIONAL POLICY 
by PETER SERRACINO INGLOrr* 
THE object of this paper is to oudine a possible strategy of trans-
national institutional development at the regional level for the 
Mediterranean, but it offers us no more than a framework within 
which the major questions might possibly be discussed by the 
various specialists in their respective areas of competence (and in 
the variety of their interactions). The first part sketches out the 
thoughts at the back of the institutional proposals sketched out in 
the second part. 
The first point to be stressed is the recognition of the desirable 
complementariness of global and regional policies and institutions, 
both with regard to the Law of The Sea in particular, and to the 
New Economic Order in general. 
With regard to the Law of the Sea, it was conceived from the 
start as a project to set up global institutions which did not ex-
clude, but on the contrary called for subsidiary regional institu-
tions as well. This recognition of the complementariness of global 
and regional .institutions continues to be reflected in the actual 
state of the text under debate, however disappointing it may be in 
many respects. 1 Indeed, the disappointing nature of the insti rodons 
likely to emerge at the global level calls for attempts to seek to 
reinforce .institutions at the regional level. 'Such attempts are all 
the more necessary in those areas, like the Mediterranean or the 
Caribbean, where the application of the concept of the common 
heritage is most obviously superior, when one counts the advan-
tages to be reaped, over that of the extensions of national rights. 
Of course, developments at the regional level must be so con-
ceived as both to dovetail into and enhance, not obstruct or dim-
inish, those at global level. 
With regard to the more general context of the new economic 
order, it appears by now to have been generally recognised that 
there was a basic defect.in the first major Club of Rome report, 
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The Limits of Growth. A challenging attempt to describe the world 
as a single system jn which both natural and cultural factors .inter-
act was made, but became of its purely global approach, the .im-
portance of regional diversity tended to be discounted. Hence, both 
burdens of responsibilities and possible remedies were distorted. 
The second major 'Gub of Rome report, Organic Grouth, then took 
regional differences .into account; but the principles according to 
which the regionalisation of the world was set out by the Mesaro-
vic-P estel team appears debatable. It was of the type to which a 
harsh critic mi,ght even be tempted to apply the epithet 'backward-
looking' because of being continent-centred, as opposed to the 
forward-looking, because ocean-centred, type. 2 The Mediterranean, 
in particular, from the continental-centred point of view, simply 
ceases to be itself a region, and its bits become bits of different 
models according to which regions can be conceived. 
The first kinds of criteria are such politico-economic ones as 
are used in the Law of the Sea S.N.T. as the basis for representa-
tion on the Council of the Seabed Authority. It is dear that from 
this point of view, it is not at present, nor is it likely to become in 
the immediate future, possible to consider the Mediterranean as a 
coherent region at all. Within the area, the major divisions of the 
world criss-cross: the differences between East and West, charac-
terised by conflicting political ideologies, the differences between 
North and South characterised in terms of stages of economic dev-
elopment, the cultural differences, involving notably those between 
now secularised and other still theocratic societies. The whole 
tangle is, of course, made more complex by the existence of the 
Palestinian-Israeli problem. 
It is true that positions have been put forward which could,the-
oretically, produce coherence out of this chaos. The doctrine of 
non-alignment in the East-West competition, that of self-manage-
ment as a principle of internal national organisation, . and that of 
cultural dialogue might be taken to constitute the components of a 
coherent whole. But the practical chances of its being achieved in 
practice in the short-term must be considered to be dim. ~ t follows 
that, if these kinds of political-economic criteria were adopted as 
the only ones, then it would make no immediate sense to discuss 
the Mediterranean as a region. 
However, there are other kinds of criteria on the basis of which 
2See: Pardo and Borgese: 'The New International Order and the Law of 
the Sea: A Projection'. (I.O.I.: Occasional Papers) Malta, 1976, to which 
the rest of this paper is obviously gready, and perhaps abusively, in-
debted. 
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to consider the rational constitution of regions. At least two such 
models should be considered. 
The first model is the continent-centred regionalism, such as 
that towards which European Federalism tends, is both the hand-
iest and most relevant example. Such a model pictures of the con-
tinental region as essentially a federation of nation-states to be 
achieved by the process of the gradual transfer of power from the 
smaller to the larger unit. The model still retains the modern 
Western idea of centralized and monolithic sovereignty at its 
basis - an idea related to, and perhaps rooted in, ·in the idea of 
absolute private ownership as developed in the tradition of Roman 
Law. It has, ·therefore, an inbuil t tendency to opera te in the jungle-
competitive manner of private owners and nation-states, but on a 
larger scale, with similar results only writ large. Such a region-
alism, although it certainly tends to reduce the number of sources 
of conflict which exist among the nation states, has been shown by 
experience to be not only very difficult to realise, but also ambi-
valent in the global perspective for the stated reason. 
In the context of the Law of the Sea text, continental regionalism 
might come to be expressed eventually in the kind of regional 
centres and offices which the Seabed Authority may set up, with 
regional enterprises for the exploitation of the continental shelf 
beyond twelve miles .. Such institutions would probably fit in, for 
example, with the collective interest of the European Economic 
Community, as at present constituted, if this collective interest 
proved strong enough to overcome other fissiparous factors. 
In the context of the Mediterranean, however, continent-centred 
regionalism appears to yield unrealistic as well as undesirable 
results. On the one hand, if the present Mediterranean complex is 
looked at in terms of the stage of development reached, it can be 
readily seen that there is no simple North-South .division between 
its parts corresponding to the continents of Europe and Africa. 
There is a very complex tangle caused by the non-coincidence of 
the frontiers of nation states with socio-economic and ecological 
realities. The most obvious example is Italy, where the political 
unit ranges from very highly developed to underdeveloped parts. 
But there too are many other examples for them to be listed. ~A 
continent-centred regionalisation is bound to render the problems 
of the establishment of a new economic order in the Mediterranean 
more difficul t than it already is. 
On the other hand, the prospect of neo-colonialist relationships 
is likely to be evoked if, instead of picturing the North and the 
South sides as drifting apart into' two separate continental folds, 
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the European and the African, the picture of a Euro-Mediterranean 
region is presented. The present problems of the European Common 
Market may suggest that European regionalism is ailing partly 
because it lacks a proper Mediterranean component, but the E.E.C. 
is unlikely to get me needed cure by merely aggregating some 
more Mediterranean countries into its present state; these countries 
would instead catch Europe's sickness. It appear~, therefore, that 
what may be required is a radical change of the hitherto dominant 
model of conceiving the development of regional institutions. 
An alternative model is provided by ocean-centred regionalism. 
This type of regionalism has arisen recently in relation to environ-
mental policy, fishery management and scientific research, es-
pecially in connexion with. enclosed or semi-enclosed seas, -such 
as the Caribbean or the Mediterranean. Here, the space was not yet 
blocked as on land by me institutions of national sovereignty and 
private property. The concept of the common heritage, -which is 
related to, and perhaps rooted in, the idea of social ownership, as 
distinct from both private and state ownership, could still be ap-
plied, as was originally envisaged on a global scale by the propo-
nents of the new Law of the Sea. With reference to the Mediterran-
ean, -it does not seem to have either of the characteristics of both 
impracticality and undesirability of me continental-centred region-
alism when considered from the point of view of the area. Indeed, 
even the most cursory examination of Mediterranean history shows 
very clearly mat the periods of sea-centredness coincide precisely 
with the periods of prosperity, and vice-versa. 
The strategy appropriate to the adoption of such a model has 
been labelled Political Functionalism. However, this label should 
not be allowed to lead to confusion,due to the existence of the 
sociological school which also goes by the name of Functionalist 
and with which Political Functionalism has little, if anything, to 
do. 3 Although there is a contemporary phenomenon which point s 
most clearly to its contemporary relevance, namely the growth of 
the trans-national companies, the functional idea also harks back 
to the political institutions which preceded the birth of the nation-
states, namely, the complex system of specialized and often over-
lapping jurisdictions typical of the Middle-Ages, the phenomenon 
which Perry Anderson has called 'the parcellisation of sovereign-
ty'.4 Anderson has stressed that, in the period before the birm of 
3See: Haas E.B.:. 'Beyond the Nation State', Stanford, California, 1964. 
4 Anderson P.:: Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London 1974, pp. 
147-153 •. 
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the modern nation-states in Europe, 'political sovereignty was 
never focussed in a single centre. The functions of the State were 
(on the one hand) disintegrated in a vertical allocation downwards, 
at each level of which political and economic relations were, on 
the other hand, integrated.' The division of sovereignty was into 
'particularist zones with overlapping boundaries, and no universal 
centre of competence'. Moreover, there were two types of areas of 
competence - one, the manorial, essentially related to the unit of 
production, and another, the territorial, essentially related to geo-
graphy. Such a twofold division of competence offers strong simil-
arities to the type of the very structure set up in the Yugoslav self-
management based Constitution. It implied a dynamic tension with-
in its structure, with Courts of Justice as the central modality of 
political power instead of strong, central, legislative-executive 
institutions. 
Sea-centred political functionalism would, indeed, be much .more 
in accordance with Mediterranean tradition than a EUropean-African 
centred polarization. In fact, divisions have of course always 
existed in the Mediterranean which, if it is a system at all, remains 
today, as it has always more or less been, a complex of subsystems. 
But a careful examination of history, which it would be both out-
rageously impossible and out-of-place to attempt here, would cer-
tainly show that a real fracture, in the sense of aloofness between 
the Northern and the Southern parts, only occurred quite recendy. 
At least in the period from the emergence of Islam until the con-
temporaneous decline of Ottoman power and the rise of European 
colonialism in the area, the model of Mediterranean history can be 
pictured as follows: the regional contained two areas which were 
politically and culturally distinct, but nevertheless so clearly 
related in terms of geographical, ecological and other communica-
tion factors, that the existence and identity of each of them could 
be and was only asserted and developed in their mutual relation-
ship. This relationship, necessitated by those factors which amount 
to what Braudel has called 'structure', was however ambivalent, in 
the sense, that each side sought to profit from it in two contrary 
ways - by seeking to transfer its own characteristics on the other 
and also by borrowing from the other such characteristics as it 
lacked. The result of such a relationship was a constantly changing 
power equilibrium between the two. The dynamic character of this 
relationship was only destroyed and the balance reduced to a 
static and non-dialectically developing condition of mutual cultural 
and political aloofness by the coincidence of the Ottoman decline 
and the European colonial interventions. Even though these inter-
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ventions could not be and were not the same kind of thing as where 
they occurred in areas with a cultural as well as a power vacuum, 
they produced the deepest fracture ever experienced in the Mediter-
ranean world. 
It is now, for various reasons, impossible, even were it desil:'" 
able, to reproduce the dynamic and dialectical cultural equilibrium 
of the pre-imperialist times, ,exactly as it existed before the im-
perial deluge of last centuries. But it is possible to anticipate a 
similar result if the road towards implementing the ocean-centred 
type of regional model is taken up and pursued to some possible 
measure of fulfillment. 
The starting point of such a road should be those perceived and 
ascertained needs for which technically viable institutional solu-
tions can be set up, especially in those space which have not 
already been pre-empted by nation-srate organisations, or where 
international organisations of the required kind already exist; the 
continuation of the road would include the weaving of these insti-
tutions into an ever-spreading web, ensuring the increasing partici-
pation and acquisition of experience by as many people as possible 
in their running. 
From the political point of view, ,a frontal attack on the most 
apparent problems of the area requiring an international solution is 
avoided because of scanty prospects of success. This does not 
imply that urgent short-term responses to such problems do not 
have to be made, but that at the same time the task of working 
towards longer-term solutions by other, even if more circuitous, 
routes should be taken in hand. The creation of some new struc-
tures of transnational government may prove to be a surer way to 
ensure a radical orientation towards peaceful development, than 
the attempt to resolve immediately the political divisions of the 
Mediterranean nation-states. This bypa ssing route impl ies a three-
fold task: 
First, strengthening existing institutions which play a significant 
Mediterranean role; 
Secondly, creating one by one new institutions to fulfil urgent 
and necessary functions that are at present not being fulfilled by 
any agency; 
Thirdly, ,setting up integrative machinery to ensure the 'harmon-
ious operation of all these bodies, with the maximal participation 
of Mediterranean citizens, ·and the continued development of Medi-
terranean peaceful co-opera tion. 
The existing Mediterranean institutions with a regional com-
petence are the following: 
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A. FISHERIES 
The General Fisheries Council for the Mediterranean (GFCM) is 
a body of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United 
Nations. It was set up in 1949 with a wide competence in the field 
of fisheries research, -scientific advice, training, statistics, stand-
ards, etc. GFCM has recently decided that its competence should 
be extended to aquaculture and fish-farming. 5 It is also currently 
increasing its de jure 6 and de facto involvement in the 'adoption, 
implementation, and enforcement of conservation measures, '7 paI'" 
ticularly the protection of living resources and fisheries against 
pollution. It is to be hoped that its role will extend to the study of 
pharmacological properties of algae and other marine flora, re-
search, extraction and marketing assistance. 
The Symposium held in connection with the GFCM's 12th ses-
sion emphasized the fact that 'many of the constraints impeding a 
more rational use of Mediterranean fisheries were institutional in 
nature'. These are problems of: 
- enforcing management measures, 
- of improving fish distribution, 
- of improving statistical collection systems, 
- and the need for training at all levels, 
- need to improve communications between scientists, adminis-
trators and fishermen .. 
If the GFCM is strengthened to deal adequately with these re:-
gional problems, it could be an important component of the en-
visaged institutional network of the Mediterranean. 
B. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
The second institution is the Mediterranean Action Plan of the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). UNEP on a global 
level has a competence in geophysics; global pollution and health; 
ecosystems and natural resources; and economic and social pto-
grammes related to the environment. 
Part of UNEP fund goes into ocean-related projects, including 
several regional programmes. UNEP's action plan for the MediteI'" 
ranean, presented at the Barcelona Conference/ involves (1) An 
5 GFCM/XIII/76/ 12, 13. This involves COP RAQ-GFCM' s Co-operative 
Programme of Research into aquaculture. 
6 GFCM/XIII/76/ 4,5. 
7 GFCM/XIII/76/2, March 1976. 
8This key UNEP Mediterranean Conference, was held on 28 Jan.-4 Feb. 
1975; the major objective was the adoption of the Action Plan. 
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assessment programme whereby monitoring and research will give 
us a clear idea of the ecological state of health of the Mediter-
ranean sea; together with assistance training and equipment. 
(2) The evolution of a legal basis for regional co-operation: this 
involves oil dumping; oilspills, land-based pollution, etc. (3) A 
programme to incorporate environmental safeguards in the future 
development of the Mediterranean region. 
Detailed information for this programme will be gathered on pro-
tection of soils, recycling of fresh water, resource economics, 
waste treatment, aquaculture, and the environmental aspects of 
tourism and industrial development. 
(4) A network of stations for information and action in case of 
oilspills (arising for example from the increased Suez traffic) and 
other disasters. 
The Action Plan and the network of monitoring stations should 
be developed into an integrated Mediterranean institution in charge 
of pollution control and environmental management. The legal 
basis for regional co-operation on pollution, -which was part of the 
plan, has now been given an adequate basis in the Single Negotia-
ting Text of UNCLOS. This should now be applied to the special 
needs and problems of the Mediterranean sea. In particular: proto-
cols on oil-spills, shipping lanes to avoid congestion of marine 
traffic and consequent accident risks; and the dumping of noxious 
liquid substances; marine pollution from rivers (Rhone, Po and 
Eloro) and from pesticides from agricultural use. 
As regards the assessment programme: the International Marine 
Science newsletter stated in 1974 that 'p ethaps the worst prob-
lem in the Mediterranean is the lack of agreed baselines from which 
one can monitor pollution-included changes'. For such purposes, 
and also in connection with the disaster-action station network, a 
region a! station is being set up in Malta. 9 The whole network 
should be established as speedil y as po ssibl e and consolida ted. 
The same should be said with respect to the 'Environment and 
Development' aspect of UNEP' s Medi terranean Action Plan. 
9 CMPMRP (Co-ordinated Mediterranean Pollution Monitoring and Research 
Programme). The Expert Cvilsultauon on the Joint Co-ordinated Project on 
Pollution in the Mediterranean, 8-13 Sept. 1975, IOC (UNESCO), WMO, 
UNEP, develops operational documents for two pilot projects: (a) base-
line-studies and monitoring of oil and petroleum hydrocarbons in the sea, 
(b) coastal transport problems of pollutants. 
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C. SCIENTIFIC EXPLORATION 
The existing Mediterranean structure in the field of co-operation 
in marine science consists of the following bodies: 
1. Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (roC) (UNESCO, 
Paris). 
2. International Commission for the Scientific Exploration of the 
Mediterranean (ICSEM) (Monaco). 
3. Co-operative Investigations in the Mediterranean (CIM) (a 
joint project of roc, I CSE M, and GFCM).lO 
Starting from the third one, we may note that CL\f has the job of 
setting appropriate basic research priorities and proposing them to 
the scientific workers in the laboratories of the Mediterranean re-
search centres. 
ICSEM is a scientific body which carries out marine research, 
especially biological and issues scientific reports. 
The lOC, operating as a sub-agency of UNESCO and composed of 
representatives from 91 countries, has among its functions the co-
ordination of certain other U.N. organisations in the field of marine 
sciences: its specifically Mediterranean interests are reflected in 
the ClM and its interests are mainly in the general area of physical 
oceanography, namely o€ean science, ocean se~ices, and training, 
education and mutual assistance. IOC is also involved in two pro-
jects within U.N.E.P.'s Mediterranean Action Plan. 
The Co-operative Investigations of the Mediterranean like certain 
of roC's other 'Co-operative Investigations' bodies, was not en-
visaged to be an ongoing body, although it could become so. In 
fact, in a March 1975 meeting of the IOC, this Commission was 
concerned with 'the types of regional mechanisms to be set up to 
replace the co-operative investigations of the commission upon 
their termination'.l1 In the case of the Mediterranean, ,it seems that 
CIM at least until recently was a mosaic of national programmes 
rather than an integrated regional programme. 12 
This type of situation clearly increases the attractiveness of the 
idea of strengthening OM and ICSEM solidly integrating them into 
a Mediterranean institutional network. Whatever the outcome, the 
lOBesides many Mediterranean countries, participating states include: the 
Federal Republic of Germany, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, U.S.A. (obser-
ver), Rumania, U.K., Switzerland, U.S.S.R. 
113-9 March 1973, Cini Foundation, Venice. 
12 Dr. M. Ruivo, in Report of the First Meeting of the International Co-ord. 
Group of CI.M., F.A.O., H.Q., Rome, 10-13 Oct. 1972. 
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essentially interdisciplinary nature of ocean studies with both 
physical and biological aspects of the marine environment, it 
could, indeed, functi on as one of the regional scientific centres 
envisaged by the draft text on the Law of the Sea. 
Thus, there are three existing Mediterranean structures to be 
modified and strengthened: 
A Fisheries Body, 
An Environmen tal Protection Body, 
A Scientific Exploration Body. 
New institutions are required because certain functions, not yet 
provided for by appropriate regional institutions, now have con-
siderable importance and urgency. 
D. SEABED ACTIVITIES BODY 
A regional centre is required to regulate the activities on the 
seabed. The main requirement envisaged relates to oil, gas, and 
mineral extraction from the seabed and beneath; such a body could 
also deal with other uses of the seabed, such as human submarine 
settlements. 
The prospect of finding increasingly significant quantities of oil 
under the Mediterranean sea, and the prospect of conflicts, be-
tween adjacent or opposite nation states, make a Seabed body par-
ticularly urgent. 
The S eabed body would seek to establish common ownership 
solutions whenever and wherever feasible, possibly in the light of 
the arrangements established by the Eems-Dollard Treaty between 
Germany and Holland in the North Sea. With this body as with other 
existing or proposed regional institutions, there should be a ma-
chinery for settling disputes on a regional basis. Current conflicts, 
notably the Greek-Turkish disagreements over the Aegean oilfields 
and the oil-related demarcation dispute between Malta and Libya, 
underlines proposal. In such cases if disputed areas, the Seabed 
body should be empowered to declare common ownership over the 
disputed areas and arrange for pooling costs and sharing profits 
among the participating countries. 
E. ENERGY BODY 
Because of the scale of today's energy problems, and because of 
the ocean's potential in this respect, an instirution is required to 
allow the Mediterranean States to carry out a co-operative pro-
gramme of scientific research, technological innovation, exploita-
tion and mutual assistance to ensure the equitable sharing of re-
sults, with regard to unconventional sources of energy. 
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The Mediterranean sea could then be used as a common source 
of energy through such means as: 
1. Geothermal gradients. 
2. Wave energy. 
3. Wind energy or surface of the water. 
4. Solar collection on water surfaces. 
S. Currents. 
F. ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS 
A Mediterranean Development Bank could be established in order 
to achieve a more balanced growth in the area by helping to channel 
capital resources available in countries of dle region for the devel-
opment of the region. 
The tasks of such a bank and associated instiOltions should 
eventually be expanded, to aid for instance in rationalising Medi-
terranean agriculOlre, and hel p establish common Mediterranean 
policy vis-a-vis the EEC. 
The Beirut charter also proposed a Mediterranean fund, ·which 
would help cushion the effect of environmental measures taken by 
towns and to assist establishments such as sewage treatment 
plants. 
Besides reforming three existing bodies and adding new ones, an 
integrative institution, a kind of Mediterranean Council, is dlen re-
quired, to: 
(a) harmonise the activities of these bodies in view of the normal 
interactions and possible conflicts of uses of Mediterranean marine 
space and resources; 
(b) consider the needs of other activities not at present regulated 
(in a Mediterranean context) by any institutions. Proposals and 
action on creating new projects and bodies would be within the 
competence of the Council, for, besides dlose mentioned several 
other regional bodies can be envisaged, ranging from, for instance, 
a central statistical data bank to an institution for the protection 
of submarine archaeological and historical treasures. 
The Mediterranean Council could be composed of two chambers, 
in a manner analogous to the Yugoslav self-management model 
where one chamber is based on work units (factories, etc.) and the 
odler on residential units (citizens of the area).13 In the Mediter-
ranean case, there could be, on the one hand, a Technical Chamber 
formed of the policy making bodies of all the participating techni-
Befr.: 'Social Property' - Report of an International Seminar, held at the 
University of Malta by the Extension Studies Board and the International 
Ocean Institute, ed. P. Serracino Inglott. 
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cal institutions, which are transnational structures, which are 
'larger' than the nation-state. However, the history of the Mediter-
ranean, as Marx noted, is the history of its towns and their hinter-
lands, which for centuries have been the basic unit of Mediterran-
ean life. 14 Therefore, for the second chamber of the Council, there 
should be perhaps envisaged a civic or political chamber based on 
subnational institutions, namely municipal ties of Mediterranean 
towns. This would be closer to the life of the people of the Medi-
terranean and afford a measure of popular participation in the run-
ning of the Council. The civic chamber could arise out of the 
United Towns Organisation, which already exists as an associa-
tion of municipalities and has contributed to the growth of con-
sciousness of the unity of the Mediterranean environment by the 
'Beirut Olarter on the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea against 
Pollution'. The 'Civic Olamber would not be another technical 
body; it would operate along with the technical bodies, in such a 
way that decisions of the Council would always involve the Civic 
Olamber and that part of the Technical Chamber whose technical 
competence is closest to the issue at hand. 
Setting up the institutions that have been described is a matter 
for political decision-makers. However, one of the most important 
and necessary roles belongs to scholars in universities and re-
search institutions, and relates to the state of knowledge about the 
Mediterranean as a region and as a system. The importance of the 
broad-based collecting, collating and distributing of data is ob-
vious, but it may be in place to emphasise the related task of form-
ing the conceptial basis and devising the analytical tools which 
these new regional bodies need for their operation co-operation. 
Work was done along these lines at the Split Conference of Pa-
cem in Maribus held by the 101 in Yugoslavia. In this an attempt 
was made (Rosen) to present a method for carrying a systems an-
alysis of the various ecological" economic, social and political 
factors involved in the Mediterranean 'systems'. As far as I know, 
there has been no serious attempt to put this into practice, and it 
was obvious that the method itself could be improved. 
For this reason, an attempt has been made at the University of 
Malta to produce a method or language for describing complex sys-
tems; it has not yet been used to build a model of the Mediterran-
ean, but it is intended to attempt a description of the system of 
conflicting multiple uses of the region in this language. A paper is 
available for those who are interested, and discussion or preferably 
co-operation on it is very cordially invited. 
14 See: K. Mao:, Pre-Capitalist Formations, 1964, London, pp. 77-78. 
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